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NOTES
Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act:
American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers
Cooperative Ass"m
Congressional legislation is presumed to apply only within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States.' The extraterritorial application
of any paiticular law, however, depends upon the intent of the legisla-
ture.2 The general language of the Lanham Act 3 provides that the
United States courts have broad jurisdictional powers in trademark in-
fringement cases.4 Unfortunately, neither the Act itself nor its legislative
history sufficiently delineates the limits of its jurisdiction.5 Thus, the
Act's jurisdictional limits have been defined solely by judicial decisions,
and early interpretations have limited extraterritorial application of the
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). "All legislation is
prnmafacie territorial. Words having universal scope,. . . will be taken as a matter of course to
mean only every one subject to such legislation. ... Id.
2 In prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens, Congress has the power to
project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, but its
intention to do so is a matter of statutory construction. See Bowman v. United States, 260 U.S.
94, 99 (1922). Cf Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949); Blackmer v. United
States, 284' U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932).
3 Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946) §§ 1-45, 60 Stat. 427, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1976).
4 Section 1114 creates a civil action for a trademark registrant against "any person who
shall . . . in commerce" infringe a registered trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (l)(a) (1982). Sec-
tion 1121 provides the federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action under
the Act. Id. § 1121. Section 1127 defines "commerce" as "all commerce which may be lawfully
regulated by Congress." Id. § 1127.
5 See Robert, Commentaq
, 
on the Lanham Trademark Act in 15 U.S.C.A. 265, 268 (1948).
Congress intended to exercise its jurisdictional power under the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 3) to the fullest extent:
The new Act clarifies and extends the phrase 'use in commerce' far beyond
the previous laws and the decisions thereunder.
'Commerce' is defined as meaning all commerce which may be lawfully reg-
ulated by Congress. This includes commerce between States, . . . and between
States . . .and foreign nations. Since there is no limitation, it also appears to
extend to any other commerce which burdens, restricts, or interferes with the free
flow of interstate, territorial, or foreign commerce.
Further, the Senate Committee Report on the Lanham Trademark Bill states that one of the
purposes of the Act is "to carry out by statute our international commitments to the end that
American traders in foreign countries may secure the protection to their marks to which they
are entitled." SEN. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEWS 1274, 1276.
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Act to cases where the defendant is an American citizen, the infringing
act has a "substantial effect" on United States commerce, and where
there is no conflict with foreign trademark law. 6
In American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 7 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals followed well-developed precedent in
modifying this tripartite test. Rather than regarding these factors as ab-
solute requirements, the court held that they should be included as "pri-
mary elements in any balancing analysis" used to determine
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.8 By choosing to modify
rather than overrule the tripartite test, the Fifth Circuit decision in Ameri-
can Rice has created a conflict with the recent Ninth Circuit decision in
Wells Fargo and Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 9 abandoning the tripartite
test and adopting a conflicts-based jurisdictional "rule of reason."
Plaintiff, American Rice, Inc. (A.R.I.), and defendant, Arkansas
Rice Growers Cooperative Association (Riceland), were American farm-
ers' marketing cooperatives, each actively engaged in selling rice under a
number of brand names to American and foreign customers. Both coop-
eratives competed in Saudi Arabia where A.R.I. rice sales accounted for
approximately seventy-three percent of the market. A.R.I. entered the
Saudi market in 1975 when it purchased Blue Ribbon Mills, a company
that had been exporting its rice to Saudi Arabia since 1966. Blue Rib-
bon assigned its trademarks to A.R.I., including the "Abu Bint" trade-
mark and the design mark of a girl with a red, yellow, and black color
combination.10 A.R.I., which continued to market its rice in Saudi Ara-
bia under the "Abu Bint" label, acquired two United States registrations
for the girl design trademark, but failed in its efforts to obtain a Saudi
trademark registration.1 '
In 1978, Riceland introduced a new brand of rice called "Bint-al-
Arab," marketed with a similar design trademark and green, yellow, and
black colors. In late 1981, Riceland modified the "Bint-al-Arab" girl de-
sign and changed its color scheme to red, yellow, and black so that it
appeared very similar to the A.R.I. design mark. In December 1981,
Riceland began marketing another brand of rice, "Gulf Girl," also with
the design of a girl on a red, yellow, and black label.' 2 The similar de-
sign of the three labels produced confusion among consumers because
"the largely illiterate Saudi Arabian public distinguishes rice brands on
the basis of the design on the package."' 3 This similarity and resulting
6 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
7 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
8 Id at 414.
9 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
10 American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 410
(5th Cir. 1983).
11 Id. at 411.
12 Id
13 Id The importance of brand recognition because of Saudi illiteracy was evidenced by
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confusion also produced "especially good" sales for Riceland.14
A.R.I. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against
Riceland, and alleging trademark infringment and unfair competition in
violation of the common law and the Lanham Act. 15 The district court
found evidence of Riceland's unlawful intent in the similar design char-
acteristics of the three labels and enjoined its use of the trademark.16
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and went on
to clarify the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act. The
court concluded that the relevant factors in determining whether the
Lanham Act should be applied extraterritorially include the "citizenship
of the defendant, the effect on United States commerce, and the exist-
ence of a conflict with foreign law." 17 The court qualified the use of
these factors by noting that the degree of effect on United States com-
merce need not be substantial, and the absence of any one factor is not
dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. Although these factors would be
the primary elements in any balancing analysis, the court believed that
judicial inquiries should not be limited exclusively to these
considerations. 18
Applying these principles, the court found all three factors present
in American Rice. Riceland was clearly an American corporation; 19 no
conflict with foreign law existed because the defendant had failed to es-
tablish a superior foreign right to use the trademark;20 and even though
the ultimate sale of the competing brands occurred in Saudi Arabia, and
none of the products made their way back into the United States, the
court found that Riceland's use of an infringing mark adversely affected
United States commerce by diverting sales from A.R.I. 2' Thus, the court
held that the contacts and interests of the United States were sufficient to
support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Lanham
Act, and issued injunctions against Riceland.
The present jurisdictional limits on American trademark laws are
best understood by analyzing the development of principles of extraterri-
torial application under both the common law and the Lanham Act.
Prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act, suits for trademark infringe-
ment sounded in tort, and the law of the place in which the offense oc-
A.R.I.'s use of promotional items containing the "Abu Bint" logo rather than media advertis-
ing. American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1376, 1381
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
14 532 F. Supp. at 1382.
15 701 F.2d at 412.
16 Id.
17 Id at 414.
18 Id
19 Id
2 0 Id at 415.
21 Id
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curred governed the right of recovery. 22 The "place of the tort" in
trademark infringement is the place where the "passing off" occurs, ie.,
where the infringing products are entered into competition with the pro-
tected products of the trademark holder.23 Under this earlier test, the
central question in determining the court's jurisdictional authority was
whether the infringing acts occurred within the United States. 24 If the
alleged trademark infringement occurred wholly in a foreign country,
the action could not be reached by United States laws. 25
Courts later circumvented this restriction by holding that American
trademark protection was available whenever any part of the infringing
act or scheme occurred within the United States.26 This approach was
initiated in Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. ,27 where the court allowed an
infringement action because the illegal scheme was conceived and par-
tially performed in the United States, although the actual "passing off"
occurred in a foreign country. 28 Under this interpretation, United States
courts could assume jurisdiction over foreign acts of infringement when-
ever some aspect of the unlawful activity occurred within the United
States.
The effect of a valid foreign trademark registration on the extraterri-
torial application of United States trademark laws was first considered in
George W. Lufl v. Zande Cosmetic Co. 29 In Lufi, the Second Circuit held
that when both parties are doing business in the same country, and the
defendant has a registered trademark, the defendant's sales do not consti-
tute an infringement of the plaintiff's trademark.3 0 Thus, Lufl estab-
22 This is commonly referred to as the principle oflex locidecti: the creation and extent of
tort liability is governed by the law of the place where the last act necessary to constitute a
wrong took place. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS OF LAW, § 378 (1934); H. GOODRICH, CON-
FLICTS OF LAW, § 92 (3d ed. 1949).
23 Under this rule, the wrong consists solely of physical acts of the defendant. This "physi-
cal act" doctrine is now generally rejected by American courts, and the harm resulting from the
wrong is said to be the wrong for the purpose of lex loci decti. H. GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF
LAW, § 93.
24 J. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
144, 348-49 (1924).
25 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 122 F. 105, 106 (C.C.D.N.J. 1903).
26 See, e.g., Hecker H-O Co. v. Holland Food Corp., 36 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1929) (labelling
of goods with infringing mark in the United States established locus of liability). See also, Morris
v. Altstedtler, 93 Misc. 329, 156 N.Y.S. 1103 (Sup. Ct.), afd, 173 App. Div. 932, 158 N.Y.S.
1123 (1916).
27 154 F. 867 (C.C.D.N.J. 1907), a.fd, 162 F. 671 (3d Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 515
(1909).
28 Id. at 874.
29 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denid, 323 U.S. 756 (1944). Prior to Lufl, the courts usually
ignored such factors as citizenship of the parties, the substantiality of the effect on commerce,
and the effect of foreign trademark laws, in asserting jurisdiction. Instead, they followed the
presumption "that the law in the foreign countries where any part of the fraudulent business
was carried on is the same as our own and that the fraudulent acts are unlawful there as here."
154 F. at 875.
30 142 F.2d at 540. The Lufl court also enumerated two other variations of the problem of
the use of a trademark in foreign countries by persons other than the American registrant. In
countries where both parties are doing business and the defendant has not registered its trade-
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lished the principle that a defendant's use of a trademark sanctioned
under the law of the nation where the alleged infringement occurred
does not provide grounds for an infringement action under United States
law. 3 1
The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, contains broad jurisdictional lan-
guage, but neither the Act nor its legislative history defines its actual
coverage.32 The potential scope of the Act has been determined solely by
judicial decisions. Historically, extraterritorial application of the Lan-
ham Act has been limited to cases in which the defendant is a United
States citizen, the infringing act has a "substantial effect" on United
States commerce, and where there is no conflict with trademark rights
established under foreign laws.3 3 This tripartite test was developed in
the first two cases to interpret the jurisdictional reach of the Lanham
Act.3 4
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. ,a3 the defendant, a United States citizen
operating a watch business in Mexico, imported parts from the United
States and Switzerland and assembled them with the United States regis-
tered trademark of the plaintiff, a United States corporation. Although
the watches were sold exclusively in Mexico, some were brought into the
United States by returning Americans. The defendant had obtained a
Mexican trademark registration, but it was invalidated in a Mexican suit
by the plaintiff.3 6
The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's activi-
ties came within the jurisdiction of United States courts. First, the Court
found that the Lanham Act "[did] not constrict prior law or deprive the
court of jurisdiction previously exercised." T37  Citing Vacuum Oil, the
Court applied the "place of the tort" test and found that the purchase of
parts in the United States was sufficient to create jurisdiction. Although
the defendant's acts in the United States were legal when viewed in isola-
tion, the Court ruled that they were illegal as essential steps in an unlaw-
ful scheme of trademark infringement.3 8
The Bulova court then examined the congressional intent behind the
Lanham Act and concluded that the Act's powers were coextensive with
mark under the laws of the foreign country, it has infringed the plaintiff's trademark and can be
sued in United States courts under American law. In countries where the defendant is doing
business and the American registrant fails to prove he is now, or is likely to do business in the
foreign country, the defendant does not infringe the plaintiff's trademark. d
31 See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act. Wells Fargo and Co. v. Wells Fargo
Express Co., 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 173, 179 (1979-80).
32 See supra note 5.
33 See supra note 6.
34 Id
35 344 U.S. 280 (1952). See Note, The Bulova Case: Lex Loci Delicti v. International Trade-
Mark Protection, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 677 (1952-53).
36 344 U.S. at 285.
37 Id at 287.
38 Id. The Court in Bulova remarked that "[a]cts in themselves legal lose that character
when they become part of an unlawful scheme." Id
1983]
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all commerce powers vested in Congress, and thus, provided for the ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction necessary to reach the defendant's activities.3 9
Three factors supported the Court's determination. The defendant was a
United States citizen; no conflict with Mexican law existed because the
defendant's registration had been invalidated; and the defendant's in-
fringing acts had an unlawful effect in this country.40 The Court's con-
sideration of this third factor signified a change in the emphasis of its
inquiry from the locus of the illegal act to the effect of the illegal act on
United States commerce.4 1
Interpreting Bulova, the Second Circuit in Vanity Fair Mills v. T Ea-
ton, Co. ,42 devised the tripartite test. Plaintiff, an American corporation,
manufactured and sold goods in the United States and Canada under a
United States trademark beginning in 1914. Defendant, a Canadian
corporation, registered the same trademark in Canada in 1915. From
1945 to 1953, the defendant distributed the plaintiff's trademarked goods
in Canada. In 1953, the defendant began manufacturing and selling
goods under his own Canadian trademark and threatened its competitors
with suit if they continued to sell the plaintiff's goods in Canada. 43
Ruling against the plaintiff, the Vanity Fair court held that the Lan-
ham Act did not apply to sales made under a valid foreign trademark by
a foreign national in his own country. Although the court found a sub-
stantial effect on United States commerce, it based its denial of jurisdic-
tion on the failure of the two remaining considerations: the defendant
was not a United States citizen and it held a valid foreign trademark.44
The court believed that Congress had intended to limit extraterritorial
application of the Act solely to the conduct of American citizens, and
then, only when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not
infringed.45
The cases that have followed Bulova and Vanity Fair have established
that the absence of any single factor in the tripartite test is not dispositive
of the jurisdictional question. In addition, these cases have emphasized
the growing importance of the "effect on commerce" consideration.
In Ramirez and Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co. ,46 the court was
39 Id. at 286-87.
40 Id
41 Id The Bulova Court's use of cases arising under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982), to support its decision illustrates its emphasis on the effects on American commerce
rather than the presence of overt acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917). See also The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV.
143, 144 (1953-54); Comment, International Law-Trademarks-Lanham Act Construed As Applicable
to Watches Manufamtured and Sold in a Foreign State, 16 U. DET. L.J. 136, 142 (1953).
42 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), noted in 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 103
(1957); 70 HARV. L. REV. 743 (1956-57); 55 MICH. L. REV. 887 (1956-57); 8 SYRACUSE L. REV.
111 (1956-57).
43 234 F.2d at 638.
44 d. at 642-43.
45 Id.
46 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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required to determine the effect of the defendant's valid foreign trade-
mark. 47 The facts in Las Palmas closely parallel those of Bulova. The
plaintiff, a United States corporation, sold canned foods in the United
States and Mexico under a United States trademark. The defendant,
also a United States corporation, acquired a Mexican trademark and
began manufacturing an identical line of food products which were
packaged in materials imported from the United States, including coun-
terfeit labels. The defendant's products were sold only in Mexico, but
were purchased by American citizens in Mexican border towns and
brought into the Unites States.48
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia found jurisdiction to exist after determining that all three factors
of the tripartite test were satisfied. First, the defendant was a United
States citizen. Second, its infringing acts had produced a substantial ef-
fect on United States commerce. 49 Finally, the court concluded that the
Mexican trademark registration did not provide sufficient conflict of law
or public policy reasons to preclude extraterritorial jurisdiction. The de-
fendant was under no duty to use the trademark and Mexico had no
interest in the exercise of the privilege. 50 The Las Palmas decision em-
phasized that a conflict with foreign law is not necessarily an absolute
prohibition against jurisdiction and implied that the rule pronounced in
Lujl, precluding a suit under United States law where the defendant
holds a valid foreign trademark, is incorrect.
In Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilhng Co. ," the court repudiated
the "place of the tort" test and upheld jurisdiction even though there was
no substantial effect on United States commerce. The defendant, a
United States corporation distributing whiskey in the United States, li-
censed a Panamanian corporation as its exclusive distributor in Panama
and supplied it with labels, bottles, and Scotch malts. Instead of mixing
the malts with Scotch spirits as the label indicated, the licensee used local
spirits and passed the product off as "Scotch" throughout Panama.52
The plaintiffs were two British distillers and an association of distill-
ers and merchants organized to promote the world-wide sale of Scotch.
47 Unlike earlier courts, the Lar Palmar court was unable to dodge the question of a valid
foreign trademark. In Bulova, the defendant's Mexican trademark was nullified before the
Supreme Court heard the case. 344 U.S. at 285. In Vanity Fatr, the court declined to consider
the issue because it found the defendant's Canadian citizenship sufficient reason to deny juris-
diction. 234 F.2d at 642-43.
48 146 F. Supp. at 599.
49 Id. at 601-02.
50 Id at 602. The court stated:
For at the most defendants' Mexican registration of plaintiff's mark can have no
greater effect than to confer upon defendants a license or permission to use the
mark in Mexico. It is not even contended that any public policy of Mexico re-
quires defendants ever to exercise that license. Id
See also Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.), affd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
51 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973).52 d at 812.
1983]
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The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's actions violated the Lanham
Act's prohibition against false designation of the origin of goods in com-
merce.5 3 The defendant argued that since the whiskey was distributed
only in Panama, it had not entered "commerce" under the Act, and
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.54 The Seventh Circuit rejected
the defendant's argument and the "place of the tort" test, ruling that a
course of business initiated by a United States licensor is "commerce"
under the Lanham Act, and therefore, within the jurisdiction of the
United States courts, even though the business activity occurred outside
the territorial limits of the United States and had no significant effect
upon United States commerce.55 The court found support for its deci-
sion in the Lanham Act's secondary purpose of providing foreign citizens
with the same trademark rights and remedies as United States citizens,
and insuring effective protection against unfair competition. 56
In Wells Fargo and Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co. ,57 the Ninth Circuit
asserted jurisdiction over the activities of a foreign citizen and substan-
tially revised the test for determining extraterritorial jurisdiction under
the Lanham Act. The plaintiffs, two United States corporations, sought
to enjoin the use of the trademark "Wells Fargo" by the defendants, a
Liechtenstein corporation owned by a German national and its Ameri-
can subsidiary. 58 The district court, applying the tripartite test, found
no subject matter jurisdiction. 59 The Court of Appeals, relying almost
entirely on Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,60 a Ninth Circuit
decision involving extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, ruled
that the district court had erred in its rigid application of the test. The
Wells Fargo court believed that extraterritorial application of the Lan-
ham Act should be approached not in terms of the "locus of the activity
to be reached," but rather in terms of the "nature of its effect on com-
merce which Congress may regulate. '61 The court also rejected the dis-
53 Id. at 811.
54 Id at 813.
55 Id at 812. The court concluded:
No principle of international law bars the United States from governing the con-
duct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the
rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. Congress has the power
to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United
States, although some of the acts are done outside territorial limits. Id.
56 Id. at 811-12. See SEN. REP. No. 1333, supra note 5. See also 43 U. CINN. L. REV. 424,
428 (1974).
57 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
58 
Id. at 411.
59 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Nev. 1973), va-
cated, 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
60 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For further discussion of Tnberlane, see Kestenbaum,
Antitrust's "Extratemtorial"Jurisdition: A Progress Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 311 (1982); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos" Constructing a Normatbe Theory of the
Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 733 (1977); Note, Sherman Act
Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Soverezgns, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247 (1977). See also 4 BROOK-
LYNJ. INT'L L. 97 (1977-78); 18 HARV. INT'L LJ. 701 (1977); 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 321 (1977-78).
61 556 F.2d at 428.
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trict court's requirement that the effect on commerce be "substantial,"
stating that "some" effect is sufficient.6 2
The most important element of the Wells Fargo decision was the
adoption of a balancing process which considers American and foreign
interests in the determination of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court
stated that the three traditional factors; degree of effect on commerce,
citizenship, and conflict with foreign law, are relevant to the resolution of
the jurisdictional issue, but are not absolute requirements. Rather, each
factor is just one consideration to be balanced in a conflicts-based juris-
dictional "rule of reason" of comity and fairness. 63 Applying this princi-
ple to the facts, the court held that an action would lie under the
Lanham Act regardless of the defendant's citizenship or the fact that
some of the infringing acts occurred abroad, if the defendant's infringing
acts had an effect on the plaintiff's business and were a deliberate at-
tempt to cause confusion among the public. 64
The Wells Fargo court's adoption of the Timberlane jurisdictional
"rule of reason" was appropriate in view of the similar history and sub-
ject matter of the Sherman and Lanham Acts. First, both the Sherman
and Lanham Acts regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 65 Second,
in both instances, neither the Act nor its legislative history gives any clear
indication of the scope of jurisdiction conferred, their limits having been
defined solely by judicial decision. 66 Finally, in defining the extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction of both acts, courts have narrowed the analysis to the
same primary considerations: degree of effect on commerce, citizenship,
and conflict with foreign law.6 7
In American Rice, the Fifth Circuit failed to adopt by analogy the
Timberlane test of extraterritorial jurisdiction,68 choosing instead to base
its jurisdictional test on Lanham Act precedent. 69 A comparison of the
two tests shows that this choice has resulted in the creation of two sub-
stantially different jurisdictional standards.
Under the American Rice test, the citizenship of the defendant, the
62 Id. The court noted that, "since the origins of the substantiality test apparently lie in
the effort to distinguish between intrastate commerce, which Congress may not regulate as such,
and interstate commerce, which it can control, it may be unwise blindly to apply the factor in
the area of foreign commerce over which Congress has exclusive authority." Id
63 Id. at 428-29. See also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
64 556 F.2d at 430.6 5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 ;id §§ 1114 (1)(a) & 1127.
66 See supra note 5; Note, supra note 60, at 1248-49. The Wells Fargo court justified reliance
on an antitrust case in a single sentence: "In Timberlane, we set down a jurisdictional rule of
reason to govern the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act which, like the Lanham Act,
contains sweeping jurisdictional language." 556 F.2d at 427.
67 See American Rice, 701 F.2d at 414; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
68 This position is difficult to understand in view of the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the
Timberlane test as it applies to the Sherman Act in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,
671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982).
69 Although the American Rice court cited Timber/ane in referring to the extraterritorial
reach of the Sherman Act, it implicitly rejected the test by relying on cases decided under the
Lanham Act to determine the jurisdictional issue. 701 F.2d at 413.
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effect on United States commerce, and the existence of a conflict with
foreign law are the relevant factors to be considered in determining
whether the contacts with, and interests of, the United States are suffi-
cient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The American
Rice court cited Bulova and Lufi as primary authority for this position. 70
Qualifying these factors, the court incorporated the modifications made
by courts in later Lanham Act cases. It stated that the absence of any
single factor is not dispositive of the jurisdictional issue and that courts
should not limit their inquiry exclusively to these considerations.
Rather, these factors should be the primary elements in any balancing
analysis.
7
'
The American Rice test has three distinguishing characteristics. First,
due to its reliance on precedent, any evaluation will be constrained by
prior decisions, and thus, largely retrospective in nature. Second, the
purpose of the American Rice test is to evaluate the relevant factors in
determining whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, rather than
to establish the existence of jurisdiction. This consideration suggests a
policy of abstention; even though the court has jurisdiction over the for-
eign act of infringement under the Lanham Act, in appropriate cases, it
will decline to exercise jurisdiction in deference to foreign interests and
sovereignty. Third, the American Rice test establishes a purely discretion-
ary balancing analysis. The test provides for consideration of an indefi-
nite number of factors, giving the court the discretion to decide the
jurisdictional issue in whatever manner it chooses. These competing con-
siderations are the result of the sparse and ambiguous language of the
American Rice opinion, creating uncertainty in application of the revised
tripartite test which may only be resolved through future judicial
interpretation.
There are two possible interpretations of the American Rice test.
Courts may interpret it broadly, including in their analysis both the pri-
mary factors and additional factors such as those enumerated in Wells
Fargo.72 Such an interpretation would conflict with the intent of the
American Rice court, however, which impliedly rejected the Wells Fargo
test when it failed to expressly adopt it. The more likely alternative is
70 Id at 414.
71 Id
72 The Wells Fargo court, quoting Tmberlane, stated:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the location or principal
places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is ex-
plicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
556 F.2d at 428-29. These factors were borrowed from K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS ABROAD 286 (1958), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 40 (1965).
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that courts employing the American Rice test will continue to limit the
analysis to the primary factors of citizenship, effect on commerce, and
conflict with foreign law, because the test relies on Lanham Act prece-
dents that focus solely on these factors. Since these precedents shaped the
American Rice analysis, any determination based on the American Rice test
will be retrospective and limited to balancing the primary considerations
found in the earlier tests. Thus, although the Amercan Rice court at-
tempted to broaden the scope of the tripartite test, its failure to enumer-
ate the specific factors to be considered in determining jurisdiction and
its strict adherence to Lanham Act precedent, has done little to alter the
traditional tripartite test.
The Wells Fargo test for extraterritorial jurisdiction 73 differs from the
American Rice test in three major aspects. First, whereas the American Rice
test allows for discretionary exercise of jurisdiction, the Wells Fargo test is
mandatory; the district court must engage in the balancing process re-
quired by the tripartite test in determining the existence of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. One authority has described this test as "a judicially
objective standard of comity" to be applied "as a matter of law, not
merely as a matter of discretion."'74
Second, although the balancing process of the Wells Fargo tripartite
test provides for the flexibility necessary to meet varying situations, and
73 The Wells'Fargo test takes a "conflict of laws" approach by requiring the court to bal-
ance the United States interests in enforcement against the conflicting interests of foreign na-
tions in determining the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This analysis is the result of
the absence of a clear statutory standard, and concern with international comity and heavy-
handed assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the past, which have been viewed abroad as
overreaching interference with the policies and laws of sovereign nations. See Kestenbaum,
supra note 60, at 315-16.
The Wells Fargo test requires a tripartite analysis of the jurisdictional question. First, the
plaintiff must show that the alleged infringement has some effect - actual or intended - on
the foreign commerce of the United States. 556 F.2d at 428. This element creates a threshold
requirement for the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act. Second, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the effect is great enough to establish a cause of action upon
which relief may be granted. Id. This factor addresses the effect on competition which is an
essential substantive element of any Lanham Act violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976). Third,
the court must evaluate whether the interests of, and links to, the United States - including the
magnitude of the effect on American commerce - are sufficiently strong, vis a vis those of other
nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 549 F.2d at 613. This third ele-
ment requires the court to balance a specific set of factors in determining whether extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction should be asserted as a matter of international comity and fairness. By actually
including a detailed examination of the interests of other nations among the criteria for the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Wel/s Fargo test insures that these interests are given
full and proper consideration.
This evaluation does not require the court to determine the validity of the foreign policy or
law, which is prohibited by the "act of state" doctrine, but permits it to weigh the "relative
involvement and concern of each state." 549 F.2d at 615, n.34.
74 J. Shenefield, The Extraterritorial Impact of US. Anti-trust Laws. Causes and Consequences,
Remarks to ABA Section of International Law (Aug. 9, 1978), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
$ 50,386 at 55,857. See also, Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 n.7
(5th Cir. 1982) (ruling that the balancing test presents a question of law, not one of discretion,
that is fully reviewable on appeal). Contra Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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is sufficiently standardized to produce consistent results, it does not set
any priorities among the relevant factors, and does not define the degree
to which American interests must outweigh international comity consid-
erations in order to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. 75 The tripartite
test thus becomes prospective in nature; the priorities and standards
needed to guide the courts in their application of jurisdiction under the
Lanham Act will be developed in the future on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, unlike the American Rice test which employs the abstention
doctrine, the Wells Fargo test makes the balancing process an inherent
part of the jurisdictional inquiry. 76 This mandatory balancing is sup-
ported by two considerations. First, the importance of international
comity to the scope of the Lanham Act suggests that these factors should
not be treated simply as a matter of discretion by the trial court. Second,
since the jurisdictional scope of the Lanham Act is largely a question of
statutory construction, one limitation is the presumption that Congress
did not intend the statute to be applied in a manner inconsistent with
international law.77
These conceptual differences have a significant impact on the prac-
tical application of both the American Rice and Wells Fargo tests. The
American Rice standard provides for the mechanical application of a lim-
ited number of factors. This characteristic makes the defendant's liabil-
ity for trademark infringement under the American Rice test highly
predictable, and presumably, more easily avoided. In contrast, the bal-
ancing approach of the Wells Fargo test enables the court to consider a
range of foreign interests and policies. The Wells Fargo test has a sub-
stantial degree of flexibility, which makes it more difficult to circumvent
the Lanham Act, regardless of the ingenuity of the infringing scheme.
Unfortunately, this flexibility is viewed by some as making the extraterri-
torial application of the Lanham Act unpredictable, and thus, as unfair
to foreign nations.78 In contrast, the American Rice test provides for a high
degree of uniformity and consistency, which in turn, creates greater re-
spect for, and acceptance of, decisions of American courts.
The most critical difference between the American Rice and Wells
Fargo tests is the number of factors to considered in determining jurisdic-
tion. Under the American Rice test, the court is limited to an examination
of citizenship, effect on American commerce, and conflict with foreign
law. The Wells Fargo test weighs these same considerations as well as
others, such as "the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
75 See Note, supra note 31 at 192.
76 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 270-71
(2d ed. 1981). The Timberlane court saw the balancing process as a substitute for the "substanti-
ality" and "intent" elements incorporated in the earlier "effects test" of jurisdiction. See Com-
ment, Sherman Act Litigation. A Modern Generic Approach To Objective Territorialjurnsdiction and the Act
of State Doctrine, 84 DICK. L. REV. 645, 664-65 (1979-80).
77 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 76.
78 Id. at 180.
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expected to achieve compliance, . . . the extent to which there is an ex-
plicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of
such effect, and the relative importance, to the violations charged, of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
' 79
The well-defined facts in Amertcan Rice make it highly likely that the
court would have reached the same result under either test. Given a
more nebulous set of circumstances and the application of different tests
with different considerations, however, it is possible that courts would
reach inconsistent results. This jurisdictional division makes the plain-
tiffs cause of action dependent not only on the merits of his case, but also
on his choice of forum.80
It is unfortunate that the American Rice decision was not appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, which has not rendered an interpreta-
tion of the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act since it did so ini-
tially in Bulova in 1952. Today, the world of commerce is more
intergrated and complex than it was thirty years ago, and citizenship,
effect on commerce, and conflicts with foreign laws are no longer conclu-
sive by themselves. In determining the jurisdictional question, courts
must balance two competing interests: the protection of American inter-
ests abroad and non-interference with the sovereignty of other nations.
These considerations are of prime importance today in light of the
growth of multinational corporations and the increase in the number of
international business transactions. To safeguard these global interests,
the United States must be able to protect the owners of its registered
trademarks from infringement and unfair competition. In doing so,
however, the United States must avoid the heavy-handedness of the past
and recognize the interests and policies of other nations. The Supreme
Court, at its next opportunity, should resolve the jurisdictional split that
currently exists by adopting the Wells Fargo test as the one test for extra-
territorial application ofthe Lanham Act.
-ANDREW COGDELL
79 556 F.2d at 428-29.
80 See generally R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 265-66 (5th ed.
1978); WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4004 (1977).
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